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COOK AND THE CORPORATE 
SHAREHOLDER: A BELATED REVIEW OF 
WILLIAM W. COOK'S 
PUBLICATIONS ON CORPORATIONS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, AS AP-
PLICABLE TO RAILROAD, BANKING, INSURANCE, MANUFACTUR-
ING, COMMERCI.AL, BUSINESS, TURNPIKE, BRIDGE, CANAL, AND 
OTHER PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. By William W. Cook. New 
York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1887. Pp. xciv, 787. 
Although William W. Cook is best known today as the donor of 
the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle, he was chiefly known 
during his active life as the author of the leading treatise on the law 
of corporations. First published in 1887, his treatise "became at 
once the standard work on corporation law," according to Cook's 
obituary notice in the Yearbook of the New York City bar.1 A cen-
tury later, when Morton Horwitz surveyed the evolution of corpo-
ration law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he 
cited Cook more often than any other author of a treatise on 
corporations.2 
* Henry M. Butzel Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1932, 
Grinnell; LL.B. 1936, Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia; LL.D. 1971, Grinnell. - Ed. 
1. Henry Wmthrop Hardon, Memorial of William Wilson Cook, in N.Y. CITY B. AssN. 
Y.B. 1931, at 365, 366. "The treatise," as the term was used by Hardon and by the present 
review, embraces Cook's A TREATISE ON nm LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS (1st ed. 
1887) and its continuation under the titles, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND 
GENERAL CoRPORATION LAw (2d ed. 1889), A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, 
BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (3d ed. 1894), and A TREATISE ON 
nm LAW OF CoRPORATIONs HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK (4th ed. 1898, 5th ed. 1903, 6th ed. 
1908, 7th ed. 1913, 8th ed. 1923) [hereinafter CooK, TREATISE, supra note 1 ([edition 
numb'er] [year])]. 
2. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORnroooXY 65-107 (1992). I counted fourteen references to various edi-
tions of Cook's treatise, supra note 1, in Horwitz's notes 55, 60, 79, 101, 110, 113, 118, 128, 
162, 164, 167, 179, 191, 193. Cook's nearest rival was SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTA-
RIES ON nm LAW OF PRIYATE CoRPORATIONS (1st ed. 1894) [hereinafter THOMPSON, COM· 
MENTARIES, supra note 2 ([edition number] [year])] with thirteen citations - Horwitz's notes 
30, 54, 56, 119, 168, 178, 183, 184, 204, 205, 207, 208, and 210. I found four citations to various 
editions of JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON nm LAW OF PRIVATE COR· 
PORATIONS AGGREGATE (1st 1832, 6th ed. 1858, 7th ed. 1861, 11th ed. 1882) [hereinafter, 
ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2 ([edition number] [year])] in Horwitz's notes 126, 
139, 209, and 210. Horwitz made four references to V1croR MoRAWETZ, A TREATISE ON 
nm LAw OF PRIYATE CoRPORATIONS (1st 1882, 2d ed. 1886) [hereinafter MoRAWETZ, TREA· 
TISE, supra note 2 ([edition number] [year])] in notes 127, 143, 144, and 145; two references to 
1724 
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Cook's writings on trusts, on industrial concentration, and on 
railroads grew out of his law practice, which began in New York 
City in 1882, shortly after his law·school graduation, in the employ-
ment of Frederic B. Coudert.3 Through the Coudert office Cook 
met John W. Mackay,4 who had made a fortune in Nevada's Com-
stock lode and moved to New York in 18835 - the same year in 
which Cook was admitted to the New York bar.6 In 1884, Mackay 
co-founded the Commercial Cable Company, which laid a transat-
lantic cable from New York to London and the Continent.7 When 
Western Union refused to relay Commercial Cable's messages in 
the United States, Mackay established the Postal Telegraph Com-
pany, and it proceeded to wage a price war with Western Union.s 
Cook became Mackay's personal counsel,9 and this association 
gave him the opportunity to make investments that were eventually 
worth millions of dollars.1° Cook's philippic against monopolies 
and trusts11 appeared at the time when Mackay was struggling to 
break the monopoly power of Western Union.12 Coincidentally, 
the principal owner of Western Union was Jay Gould,13 one of the 
HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK 
(1884) in notes 146 and 148; and one reference to GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAw OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS (1st ed. 1877) [hereinafter FIELD, TREATISE, supra note 2 
([edition number] [year])] in note 211. Arthur Ma<;:hen, Jr., a professor at the University of 
Chicago and the author of a two volume treatise, see infra notes 61, was cited only for a law 
review article in Horwitz's note 235 (citing Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 
HARV. L. REv. 253, 261-62 (1911)). 
3. Walter Hulme Sawyer, William W. Cook, University Benefactor, 36 MICH. ALUMNUS 
643, 643 (1930). . 
4. Id. 
5. See OsCAR LEWis, SILVER KlNGs: THE LIVES AND TIMES OF MACKAY, FAIR, FLOOD, 
AND O'BRIEN, LoRDs OF THE NEVADA CoMSTOCK LoDE 105 (1947); John W. Mackay, ENGI-
NEERING & MINING J., Jan. 1989, at 112C. These sources say that Mackay sold his Comstock 
interests in 1883, but an obituary in 1902 reported that he still owned controlling interests in 
several of the Comstock mines at the time of his death. John W. Mackay Dies in London, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1902, at> 1. 
6. Allen Schoenfield, W.W. Cook Dies: 'M' Benefactor, DETROIT NEWS, June 5, 1930, at 
6. 
7. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 106; John W. Mackay Dies in London, supra note 5, at 1. 
8. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 106; John W. Mackay Dies in London, supra note 5, at 1. 
9. Hardon, supra note 1, at 366. 
10. Schoenfield, supra note 6, at 6. 
11. WILUAM W. CooK, "TRUSTS": THE RECENT CoMBINATIONs IN TRADE: THEIR 
CHARACI'ER, LEGAUIY, AND MODE OF ORGANIZATION, AND THE RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIA-
BIUTIES OF THEIR MANAGERS AND CERTIFICATE-HOLDERS (2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter, 
CooK, TRUSTS]. This work consists of 63 small pages of text and 50 pages of appendices. I 
have found no record of the first edition but presume that it was published in the same year, 
because the only copyright date is 1888, and the preface is dated February 23, 1888. The 
second edition may have been issued only to include the appendices, consisting of a report of 
a New York Senate committee and accompanying documents, which were completed on Feb-
ruary 29, 1888. 
12. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 105-08. 
13. Id. at 106. 
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notorious perpetrators of stock frauds14 of the kind that Cook de-
nounced in his treatise (pp. 23, 667).1s 
Mackay eventually linked Commercial Cable, Postal Telegraph, 
and other companies in the Mackay Companies, which owned the 
"entire capital stock of the Commercial Cable Co., and a majority 
of all of the capital stocks of a large number of telegraph, tele-
phone, and cable companies in the United States, Canada and Eu-
rope, including the land line system known as the Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co."16 For many years prior to his retirement in 1921, Cook 
was general counsel for the Commercial Cable and Postal Tele-
graph Companies and for the Mackay Companies.17 
COOK ON CORPORATIONS 
Cook's major innovation in corporation theory was to recognize 
the corporate investor as a central figure of legal concern. He cap-
tured this view in the title of the first three editions of his treatise, 
which he called not Corporations, but Stock and Stockholders. 18 
Before Cook, most authors treated private corporations less as as-
sociations of shareholders than as instruments of the state with their 
rights and liabilities defined by their charters. 
The leading American treatise on corporation law before Cook 
was that of Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames, which had gone 
through eleven editions from 1832 to 1882.19 Its plan of organiza-
tion was very similar to that of a 1793 treatise published in London 
by Stewart Kyd.20 Although Kyd purported to include joint stock 
companies, most of his text and citations related to nonprofit corpo-
rations that had neither stock nor stockholders. These nonprofit 
14. MArnmw JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS 
1861-1901, at 122-23, 158-59 (1934). 
15. All parenthetical references are to CooK, TREATISE, supra note 1 (1st ed. 1887). 
16. 3 MOODY'S ANALYSES OF INVESTMENTS AND SECURITY RATING BooKS: PUBLIC 
UTILITY INVESTMENTS 203 (1921). 
17. The title page of Cook's A SOLUTION OF THE RAILROAD PROBLEM IN SIGHT (1919) 
[hereinafter CooK, SOLUTION] identified the author as "General Counsel of The Mackay 
Companies, Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, Commercial Cable Company, and author of 
'Cook on Corporations.' " A reporter identified him as "general counsel for the Mackay 
Companies" in W.W. Cook Dies: Was Noted Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1930, at 27. Ac-
cording to Some Graduates of the Department of Law of the University, 14 MICH. ALUMNUS 
251, 258 (1907-1908), Cook was "general counsel for the leading telegraph companies" of 
New York City in 1908. 
18. See CooK, TREATISE, supra note 1 (1st ed. 1887, 2d ed. 1889, 3d ed. 1894). 
19. ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2 (1st ed. 1832, 2d ed. 1843, 3d ed. 1846, 4th 
ed. 1852, 5th ed. 1855, 6th ed. 1858, 7th ed. 1861, 8th ed. 1866, 9th ed. 1871, 10th ed. 1875, 
11th ed. 1882). 
20. STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONS (1793). Kyd's was the 
first English-language treatise on the subject according to Angell and Ames. ANGELL & 
AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2, at vi (1st ed. 1832). 
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corporations· had supplied most of the corporate litigation up to 
Kyd's time. 
Angell and Ames's principal subjects of discussion were 
churches, charities, and universities, as Kyd?s had been.21 Later edi-
tions recognized that the rapid increase of "joint-stock corpora-
tions" called for separate attention,22 but'these editions included no 
distinct treatment of the joint stock corporation's attributes. Angell 
and Ames focused their attention on topics critical to religious and 
eleemosynary corporations such as means of creation - prescrip-
tion, common law, and legislative acts,23 corporate capacity to ac-
quire and alienate property,24 and the necessity of a corporate seal 
to bind a corporation to a contract.25 In these areas, the law was 
concerned with the relation between the corporation, viewed as a 
unit, and the state or outsiders with whom the corporation might 
deal. Angell and Ames paid scarcely any attention to the conflict-
ing interests of a corporation's internal constituents - its members 
and its managers. 
Angell and Ames's text, even in the 1882 edition, remained sin-
gularly silent on the :financial outrages that had occurred in railroad 
:financing during the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s.26 Thousands of shares 
had been forged, thousands issued in violation of court orders, and 
thousands issued for face values far in excess of what was paid for 
them.27 Angell and Ames's treatise made no mention of "stock wa-
tering," which had caused insolvencies and had probably accentu-
ated the panics of 1857 and 1873. Their treatise gave a few pages to 
the rights of "members" to sue their corporations for payment of 
debts or dividends,28 and to enjoin actions that are beyond the cor-
poration's charter powers,29 but Angell and Ames's text made no 
21. See id. at 21-31. 
22. See, e.g., ANGELL & AMEs, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 33 (11th ed. 1882). The first 
edition of this treatise had noted that "civil corporations" were "by far the most numerous in 
the United States," but the category was not characterized by stockholding, and it included 
universities. ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 25-26 (1st ed. 1832). 
23. ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 53-78 (11th ed. 1882). 
24. Id. at 120-80. 
25. Id. at 197-212. 
26. John Lathrop edited the seventh to eleventh editions of Angell and Ames's work. 
ANGELL & AMEs, TREATISE, supra note 2, at iii-iv (11th ed. 1882). Ames supervised the 
preparation of the seventh edition. In all subsequent editions, which were published after 
both authors' deaths, Lathrop preserved without change the text of prior editions, adding 
only new footnotes, which were separated from the footnotes of earlier editions. 'Id, at iv. 
27. A variety of stock frauds in this era are recounted by, among others, CLIFFORD 
BROWDER, THE MoNEY GAME IN Om NEW YoRK: DANIEL DREW AND His TIMES 83, 143-
65 (1986); JOSEPHSON, supra note 14; EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: 
BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1860-1897 (1961); ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: 
A HISTORY oF nm NEw YoRK STOCK MARKET 59 (1965). 
28. ANGELL & AMEs, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 436-37 (11th ed. 1882). 
29. Id. at 439-40. 
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suggestion that a shareholder could sue on the corporation's behalf 
for officers' or directors' frauds or neglects.3o 
Some authors who preceded Cook made minor additions to the 
analyses of Kyd and of Angell and Ames.31 George W. Field in 
1877 introduced an exposition of the powers of directors;32 Angell 
and Ames had mingled directors with other "agents" in their last 
edition.33 Victor Morawetz in 1882 prophetically attacked the doc-
trine of ultra vires. 34 Although Cook's predecessors cited cases that 
arose out of the scandals of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, their texts 
paid scant attention to the abusive practices that gave rise to the 
scandals.35 Platt Potter captured the prevailing spirit of treatise 
writers of the age in the preface of his 1881 treatise when he wrote: 
In the performance of this task, it may be needless to remark that no 
change in the established general principles of the law of corporations 
has been attempted; these principles, as found laid down in the ele-
mentary works of Blackstone and Kent, are unchanged, and will for-
ever remain the same; they are expressed by those authors in the most 
simple language, and yet with classic elegance which no time will 
improve.36 
30. Angell and Ames cited the right of a shareholder to sue an outsider on behalf of the 
corporation - established by Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. {18 How.) 331 (1855) - only to 
sustain the right of a shareholder to sue to enjoin ultra vires acts. ANGELL & AMES, TREA• 
TISE, supra note 2, at 437 {11th ed. 1882). 
31. See BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTI & AuSTIN ABBOTI, A GENERAL DIGEST OF THE 
LAw OF CORPORATIONS (1869) (containing a collection of case summaries without separate 
analysis); CHARLES T. BOONE, A MANUAL OF THE LAw APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS 
GENERALLY (1887) [hereinafter BOONE, MANuAL] (presenting a condensed pocket-size 
text); FIELD, TREATISE, supra note 2 (1st ed. 1877, 2d ed. 1883); MORAWETZ, TREATISE, 
supra note 2 {1st ed. 1882, 2d ed. 1886); PLATI POTTER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORA· 
TIONS {1881) [hereinafter POTTER, TREATISE]. 
32. FIELD, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 163-200 (1st ed. 1877). 
33. ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 284-364 (11th ed. 1882). 
34. MORAWETZ, TREATISE, supra note 2, at iv {1st ed. 1882); MoRAWETZ, TREATISE, 
supra note 2, at iv, 666-76 (2d ed. 1886). By the middle of the twentieth century, the doctrine 
was in general disrepute. See HENRY WIN'IHRoP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORA· 
TIONS 240-69 (rev. ed. 1946). Morawetz also rejected the entity conception of the corpora· 
tion. MoRAWETZ, TREATISE, supra note 2, at iii (2d ed. 1886). 
35. See BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBorr & AuSTIN ABsorr, A GENERAL DIGEST OF THE 
LAw OF CORPORATIONS 653-55 (Supp. 1879} {briefing a few cases of shares issued below par 
and of shareholders' derivative suits, but containing no exposition of the principles involved); 
BooNE, MANuAL supra note 31; FIELD, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 159-62, 188 {1st ed. 1877) 
(offering a brief exposition of overissued and watered stock and of directors' liability for 
fraud); FIELD, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 206-09, 246-47 (2d ed. 1883} (same); POTTER, 
TREATISE supra note 31. 
36. POTTER, TREATISE supra note 31, at v. Potter was, however, very conscious of the 
tremendous expansion of corporations, about which, he noted with evident misgivings: "It 
seems to have been, and is, the growing policy of the state to give countenance and encour-
agement .... " Id. at iii. But he disavowed any evaluation of the phenomenon in his treatise, 
explaining: "We do not intend - it is not our purpose - in our treatment of this subject, to 
be regarded as pronouncing this policy to be a sound one, or this condition of things to be the 
most wise; those considerations are not legitimately within the scope of this work." Id. at iv. 
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No such deference to earlier authors infected the writing of 
William W. Cook. After recognizing that others had adequately de-
veloped some parts of the ll:!-W of corporations, he observed: 
As regards the important subject of Stock and Stockholders, however, 
there has been a singular deficiency in the text-books . . . . It was 
found that many of the most important and practical principles gov-
erning stocks had never been.investigated and presented bylaw writ-
ers. [p. v] 
Cook made it clear that it was his own analyses and his own opin-
ions that entered into his treatise. He explained: "The plan of the 
work is original, and this volume is the result of a long and consci-
entious study of the sources of authority - the cases them-
selves .... [The writer] has not hesitated to express his opinion 
when the occasion seemed to warrant it" (p. vi). 
Cook's innovation was to focus on the rights of investors and on 
the abuse of investors by corporate promoters and managers. His 
novel title, Stock and Stockholders, signaled the change. The out-
rages that had been committed in railroad financing just before and 
after the Civil War made evident the need for a systematic ap-
proach to the rights of investors. By directing attention to the inter-
ests of investors, Cook initiated the orientation of corporation law 
toward the demands of capitalism. 
In a radical departure from earlier literature, Cook opened his 
analysis of stock issuance with a vivid description of offensive prac-
tices, declaring: 
It is no unusual thing for a newly organized railroad corporation to 
issue to a construction company, bonds and stock whose par value is 
many times the value of the construction wor~ done .... Soo¥, how-
ever, default is made in the payment of the interest on the bonds, and 
this is followed by corporate insolvency, foreclosure, receivership, and 
reorganization. The issue of fictitiously paid up stock is the favorite 
device of corporate promoters, organizers, and manipulators, in carry-
ing out their plans of realizing enormous gains from small invest-
ments, and in accumulating great fortunes at the expense of the 
public. [p. 23] 
After this spirited introduction, Cook expounded the case law of 
stock issuance in prose as dull as any other legal writer's, but he 
introduced a new rationale for shareholders' liability. Unlike his 
predecessors, who had treated "capital stock" as merely the sum of 
shareholders' interests in the company,37 Cook defined "capital 
stock" as "the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the amount 
37. Although Angell and Ames captioned one chapter "Of the Nature and Transfer of 
Stock in Joint-Stock Incorporated Companies," they offered no definition of "stock" beyond 
what might be implied by the statement: "By the term 'joint-stock' corporation, we would be 
understood to mean such a corporation as has for its object a division of profits among its 
stockholders." ANGELL & AME.s, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 589 (11th ed. 1882). 
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paid in or to be paid in by the stockholders ... " (p. 3), thus supply-
ing a link between stockholding and liability. Cook's recognition of 
capital as a fixed sum enabled him to give a lucid explanation of 
"watered or :fictitious stock'' and the liabilities of its holders.38 
In this and other chapters, Cook devoted 250-odd pages to lia-
bilities of shareholders for corporate debts.39 He also explained 
"overissue," the issuance of more shares than authorized by corpo-
rate charters (pp. 300-06), which had escaped the attention of An-
gell and Ames. 
In addition to exposing the evils of stock watering, Cook opened 
a new branch of doctrine under the title of his thirty-ninth chapter, 
"Fraudulent Acts of Directors, Majority of Stockholders, and Third 
Persons" (p. 666). As he had done in his chapter on shareholder 
liability, Cook began by describing the abuses that he saw in the 
marketplace. He declared: 
Corporations, with their vast capital stock, their great income, their 
rapidly changing personal property, and their large purchases and 
sales, have proved to be a temptation which corporate officers are too 
often unable to withstand. These companies have been found to be 
efficient instruments of fraud, speculation, plunder, and illegal gain. 
In these latter days the robbery and spoliation of corporations and 
stockholders by the corporate directors and managers have been sys-
tematized into well-known methods of proceeding, and the carrying 
out of such plans has become a profession and an accomplishment. 
The skill, audacity, experience, and talent of the highest order of ad-
ministrative ability have reduced to a certainty the methods of divert-
ing profits, capital, and even the existence of the corporation itself, to 
the enrichment of the corporate managers and their co-conspirators. 
Corporations become insolvent and stockholders lose their invest-
ments, while individuals become millionaires. Illegitimate gains are 
secured and enormous fortunes are amassed by the few at the ex-
pense of the defrauded, but generally helpless, stockholders. [p. 667] 
Cook pursued his exposure of directors' misdeeds with an exposi-
tion of the theory and justification of "stockholders' suits" (pp. 669-
73), which would become a central concern of corporation lawyers, 
writers, and teachers in the twentieth century as "shareholders' de-
rivative suits."40 
Another area in which Cook recognized the inadequacy of ex-
isting law was the transfer of stock. In 1887, shares of stock were 
38. Pp. 11 (defining the terms}, 22·46 (expanding liabilities). Watered and fictitious stock 
escaped mention by Angell and Ames. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
39. Pp. 11-267. Angell and Ames treated shareholders' liabilities without distinguishing 
between liability on subscriptions and liability on shares issued for deficient consideration. 
ANGELL & AMES, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 630-76 (11th ed. 1882). 
40. See, e.g., Reporter's Note, 2 THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9-17 (1994); Symposium, Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 48 L. & CoNIEMP. PRoB. 1 (1985). 
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emphatically nonnegotiable (pp. 417-18), and purchasers incurred a 
host of risks - that the shares were not fully paid for, or that they 
were subject to a lien, or that a :fiduciary had transferred the shares 
in violation of the terms of a trust (pp. 422-31). Some of these 
problems would not be alleviated until the promulgation of the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1909,41 and others not until the pro-
mulgation of the revised Uniform Commercial Code in 1956.42 
Cook foresaw the burgeoning importance of share transfers and the 
need for free transferability. He declared: 
Beyond all question, the surplus wealth of the future will be invested 
in corporate bonds and stocks. It is well, then, in these days of the 
formative period of the law governing stock, that the principles gov-
erning the transfer of certificates should be formed for the protection 
and security of an investing public, against secret liens, attachments, 
claims, and negligence of both the corporation and third persons.43 
After publishing three editions of Stock and Stockholders, Cook 
changed the title of his treatise to Corporations44 and added chap-
ters on debt securities and on "quasi-public" corporations such as 
railroad, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric, and water companies. 
He also added a volume consisting of the texts of various statutory 
and constitutional provisions affecting corporations. But the first 
fifty-two chapters of Corporations retained the order and content of 
Stock and Stockholders, modified only by expansion.45 The book 
had now grown to 2,660 pages, filling three volumes. 
Cook opened some of his new topics, like some of his original 
chapters, with summaries of the business practices underlying the 
law. Cook, however, viewed the practices that he now described 
more sympathetically than he had. viewed stock watering. Explain-
ing the rise of corporate mortgages, he observed: 
41. CHAfu.Es THADDEUS TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES FULLY 
ANNOTATED 339-54 (1920). Terry lists the date of the Act as 1910. Id. at 341. The actual 
date of the Act, however, is 1909. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENIH ANNUAL CoNFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 33 (1909). 
42. AM. LAW INST. & NAn.. CoNF. OF CoMMRS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, 1956 RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE (1957). 
The revised Code was considered promulgated with the publication of this document. HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 114-15 
(1956). See generally Francis T. Christy, Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock, 53 MICH. L. 
REv. 701 (1955); Alfred F. Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. L. 
REv. 843 (1958). 
43. P. 435. Angell and Ames, in contrast, devoted 36 pages to impediments to stock 
transfer without any suggestion that these impediments should be abated. ANGELL & AMES, 
TREATISE, supra note 2, at 594-629 (11th ed. 1882). 
44. CooK, TREATISE, supra note 1 (4th ed. 1898). 
45. Cook inserted new chapters to separate intra vires from ultra vires acts, 2 id. at 1382-
1435, to separate stockholders' actions for directors' negligence from other stockholders' ac-
tions, 2 id. at 1436-45, and to introduce a new treatment of corporate agents' authority, 2 id. 
at 1446-1571. 
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Great captains of industry arose, such as Vanderbilt and Huntington, 
who had no capital, but had force and daring, coupled with a genius 
for building, consolidating, stocking, and bonding great systems of 
railroads. The power to mortgage gave them the power to raise 
money, and the power to raise money gave them the power to make 
America what it is today.46 
Four more editions of Cook's Corporations treatise followed 
without major change in design or emphasis. Although the number 
of v~lumes doubled from four in the fourth edition to eight in the 
eighth edition, much ·of the text remained unchanged; most of the 
expansion appeared in footnotes, which often contained significant 
analysis as well as case citations and summaries.47 
Before 1923, when Cook's last edition was published, a major 
change had taken place in the law affecting "watered stock," which 
Cook had denounced in earlier editions (p. 23). Many of the major 
commercial states had destroyed the basis of liability on watered 
stock by authorizing the issuance of stock without par value.48 
In response to these changes, Cook published in the Michigan 
Law Review an analysis of the cpnsequences of eliminating par 
value.49 Cook thought that issuing stock without par value was not 
a cure for watering; it, he said, merely "conceals the mystery of the 
'water' ."50 Columbia University economist John Bonbright ex-
pressed a similar view some years later.51 Cook also claimed that 
"[t]he English way is better,"52 and endorsed the principle of "truth 
in securities," which would become the touchstone of American 
stock market reform in the 1930s.53 He quoted with approval a 
British government publication that declared: 
The trend of recent legislation in this country has been to endeavor to 
afford information concerning joint stock companies to all who may 
46. 3 id. at 1782a. But earlier volumes retained remarks on financial abuses without 
change. See 1 id. at 84-85 (discuss_ing watered stock); 2 id. at 1256 (discussing the frauds of 
directors and managers). 
47. In the eighth edition, for example, 6 pages on watered stock contained 13 lines of text 
and 600 hundred lines of footnotes. 1 Coo1<, TREATISE, supra note 1, at 159-64 (8th ed. 
1923). 
48. Statutes authorizing no-par shares, beginning with New York's in 1912 and continuing 
through 1926, are listed and analyzed by CORNEUUS w. WICKERSHAM, A TREATISE ON 
STOCK WmiOUT PAR VALUE OF ORDINARY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (1927). 
49. See Wiiiiam W. Cook, "Watered Stock" - Commissions - "Blue Sky Laws" - Stock 
without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REv. 583 (1921) [hereinafter Cook, Watered Stock]. 
50. Id. at 595. 
51. See James C. Bonbright, Preface to DAVID L. DODD, STOCK WATERING vi (1930) 
(observing that "a good many recent writers •.• have already tolled the death knell of the 
anti-stock-watering laws . . . . Their optimism has little foundation."). Cf. BALLANTINE, 
supra note 34, at 373-74. 
52. Cook, Watered Stock, supra note 49, at 595. 
53. JOEL SEUGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 11IE SE· 
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19, 20, 38 
(1982). 
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seek it, on the ground that publicity is the best protection which can be 
devised for the benefit of creditors and of investors .... 54 
In the same article, Cook applauded the requirement of prior ap-
proval of stock issues by the Federal Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, by state public service commissions, and by state commissions 
under "blue sky" laws, the origins of which he traced to a.Massa-
chusetts law of 1875.55 These laws, he concluded, "are based on the 
right principle."56 Between the English system ·of full disclosure 
and the blue sky system of prior commission approval, Cook ex-
pressed no preference: "[T]he whole subject is still in the melting 
pot."57 
While omitting prior editions' denunciation of watered stock, 
the eighth edition of Cook's treatise retained most of his earlier 
comments on the frauds of directors58 and added an observation 
that implied approval of shareholders' derivative suits: 
The expense, difficulty, and delays of litigation; the power and 
wealth of the guilty parties; the secrecy and skill of their methods; and 
the fact that the results of even a successful suit belong to the corpo-
ration, and not to the stockholders who sue, all tend to discourage the 
stockholders, and to encourage and protect the guilty parties.59 
Cook evidently viewed his eighth edition as the last of the series. 
Noting the unmanageable expansion of case law, he concluded that 
"[p]ractically the best future law books will have to emanate from 
law school professors."60 His most serious competitor, however, 
was probably not a professor, but Wtlliain Meade Fletcher, the au-
thor of an encyclopedic treatise whose first edition had appeared in 
1917.61 
54. Cook, Watered Stock, supra note 49, at 595-96 (citing a statement in "a blue book 
published by the English government in June, 1907"). 
55. Id. at 590. 
56. Id. at 591. 
57. Id. at 598. 
58. It omitted the sentences on the systematization of robbery and spoliation and on the 
"talent of the highest order" devoted to diverting profits. 3 CooK, TREATISE, supra note 1, at 
2406 (8th ed. 1923) (the page where the omitted sentences would have occurred); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
59. 3 CooK, TREATISE, supra, note l, at 2406 (8th ed. 1923). 
60. 1 id., at xi (referring to William W. Cook, The Law Book of the Future, 21 MICH. L. 
REv. 365, 371 (1923)). 
61. WILUAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF 'IHE LAW OF PruvATE CoRPORATIONS 
(1917). Since 1895, Cook's treatise had also had a serious competitor in THOMPSON, COM-
MENTARIES, supra note 2 (1st ed. 1894, 2d ed. 1908, 3d ed. 1927). A treatise of two volumes 
that is often cited by other authors, although not by Horwitz, see supra note 2, was published 
in 1908 by Arthur W. Machen, Jr., a professor at the University of Chicago. ARlHUR W. 
MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON 'IHE MODERN LAw OF CoRPORATIONS wrm REFERENCE TO 
FORMATION AND OPERATION UNDER GENERAL LAws (1908). -
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THE PRINCIPLES 
Although Cook had predicted in 1923 that the best future law 
books would be written by professors,62 he took one more fling 
with his favorite subject, which he entitled The Principles of Corpo-
ration Law63 and characterized it as "an experiment to condense, 
simplify and clarify the law, for the use of the lawyer, law student 
and layman."64 Reflecting on changes in the law since 1887, Princi-
ples rearranged and restated in a single volume most of the doctrine 
expounded in the treatise and made significant additions on 
trusts,65 reorganization,66 and constitutional law.67 
If Cook had condensed the footnotes of Principles and reorga-
nized them to match the book's text, he would have provided a use-
ful handbook and a fresh foundation for a twentieth century 
treatise. But Cook was evidently too weary for this task. Instead of 
winnowing his references to a concise few, he recurrently cited sec-
tions of his eighth edition, in which voluminous references could be 
found.68 A practitioner qr student who wanted to use Principles as 
a research aid would have had to keep the six volumes of the eighth 
edition at hand for relevant citations. Nonlawyers, who might not 
have missed the citations, would have found the exposition of Prin-
ciples too dense for easy comprehension. Unsurprisingly, the book 
was not commercially published. 69 
COOK ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 
In 1888, when Cook had completed the first edition of Stock and 
Stockholders, "trusts" were igniting debates that would lead to the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.7° Cook published a short tract on 
the evils of these concentrations of power.71 His earlier protests 
against the frauds of corporate organizers and officers were mild in 
comparison with his denunciation of the evils of trusts. After ex-
plaining how manufacturers had resorted to trusts in order to re-
strain competition and establish monopolies, Cook declared: "A 
62. See supra note 60. 
63. WILUAM w. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATION LAW (1931) [hereinafter 
CooK, PRINCIPLES] (copyright 1925). 
64. Id. at iii. 
65. Id. at 234-39. 
66. Id. at 661-89. 
67. Id. at 380-98. 
68. See, e.g., id. at 32. 
69. The only copy in the University of Michigan library shows the University of Michigan 
Lawyers' Club as the publisher and is dated 1931. 
70. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 642, 26 Stat 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
71. CooK, TRUSTS, supra note 11. 
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monopoly has ever been unjust, oppressive, and a thing of ha-
tred,"72 and "[t]here can be no compromise between a monopoly 
and an Anglo-Saxon people. "73 Cook's views were among those 
prominently noted six decades later in a leading history of antitrust 
law.74 
The wave of public opinion that led to the Sherman Antitrust 
Act was not directed narrowly at trusts, but ~t big companies in 
general. In reference to this hostility, Cook published, a year after 
the passage of the Sherman Act, a small book entitled The Corpo-
ration Problem. 15 Cook noted that after the Act's passage the for-
mer participants in trusts were reorganizing in giant corporations, 
with similar consequences.76 These corporations were better than 
trusts, he thought, because their organization was not secret, and 
they were subject to explicit statutes and charters.77 But he re-
served judgment on their legitimacy, concluding: 
The first campaign of the warfare with the trusts has been fought 
out. The victory has been with the people. The trusts have been 
routed and driven to a second line of defence. They are entrenching 
themselves under the cover of corporate charters. Whether they shall 
be driven from these remains to be seen. Certain it is that unless they 
justify their existence they will be annihilated by the courts, legisla-
tures, and new competitors.78 
Cook went on to recount the sins of corporations with all the 
vigor of a populist politician. Focusing on railroads, he described 
practices of rate discrimination, favoritism, wastefully duplicated 
lines, stock gambling, frauds on investors, monopolies, and political 
corruption.79 Furthermore, he observed: "Whatsoever is an aid to 
plutocracy is a danger to the republic. The corporation is the ally, 
the agent, the representative of plutocracy."80 
72. Id. at 54. 
73. Id. at 62. "Anglo·Saxon" was probably Cook's way of referring to English·speaking 
people; he did not designate any non· Anglo Saxons to whom monopoly was more congenial. 
Thirty.nine years later, when he distinguished between "foreigners" and the descendants of 
pre·Revolutionary settlers, he called the latter "the American stock." W1LUAM W. CooK, 
AMERICAN INsrrrunoNs AND THEIR PREsERVATION iii, 267 (1927). He used "Anglo-
Saxon" to identify the principal element, along with the Scotch-Irish, Dutch, Huguenot, Ger-
man, Irish, and Scandinavian, in the composite American, id. at 40, and to designate a people 
that had been fused with the Normans to form the English, id. at 77. 
74. See HANs B. THOREu.I, THE FEDERAL .ANrrrauST PouCY: ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADmoN 130-31, 327 (1955). 
75. Wiu.IAM W. CoOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM! THE PUBUC PHAsES OF CoRPO-
RATIONS, THEIR USES, ABUSES, BENEFITS, DANGERS, WEALTII, AND POWER, WITH A DIS-
CUSSION OF 1HE SOCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POUTICAL QUESTIONS TO WmcH 
THEY HAVE GIVEN RISE (1891). 
76. Id. at 243-44. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 245. 
79. Id. at 11-119. 
80. Id. at 249. 
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But Cook was confident of the republic's survival. He reflected: 
"The corporation holds its life subject to the will of the people .... 
Its powers may be changed, its duties increased, its charter may be 
repealed and its existence ended."81 Thanks to the power of the 
people, " 'The Corporation Problem' will be solved, and the solu-
tion, when it comes, will be satisfactory, thorough, and complete."82 
Regrettably, Cook cf.id not specify the means of solution. 
Thirty-four years later, Cook returned to the problem of mo-
nopoly in Principles. He outlined two schools of thought on the 
subject, one of which favored more legislation, more prosecutions, 
and more jail sentences; the other, which Cook described more 
sympathetically, relied on free trade and foreign competition to 
keep prices down. "Meantime," he concluded, "the courts are 
working out the problem, aided by a healthy public sentiment, 
which realizes the saving by combination and yet the danger of mis-
use of power."83 , 
COOK ON RAILROADS 
Before, during, and after World War I, Cook concerned himself 
with railroad problems.84 In 1915, he proposed a plan for reorga-
nizing the railroads, which he presented almost simultaneously in 
the Michigan and Yale law reviews.85 In the Michigan article, he 
stressed deficiencies of service to customers and of returns to inves-
tors. In his view, railroads were ground between the millstones of 
the public's demands for reasonable rates and financiers' demands 
for profits.86 
In the Yale article, Cook attacked the faults of management and 
the vacuity of managers' proposed solutions. He recalled that one 
railroad executive, in testimony before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, "solemnly asserted that the stockholders should take 
a more active part in corporate affairs."87 Adumbrating the work 
of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means,88 Cook commented: 
81. Id. at 252. 
82. Id. at 253. 
83. CooK, PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at 236. 
84. See CooK, SoLunoN, supra note 17, at 29-30 (stating that "the plan which has taken 
twelve years for me to work out, and which was first published in 1908, is now being endorsed 
generally"). I have been unable to find a copy of the 1908 publication. 
85. Wtlliam W. Cook, A Bill for the Nationalization of Railroads, 14 MICH. L. REv. 1 
(1915) [hereinafter Cook, Bill]; Wtlliam W. Cook, A Plan for the Nationalization of Rail-
roads, 24 YALE LJ. 370 (1915) [hereinafter Cook, Plan]. 
86. Cook, Bil~ supra note 85, at 3. 
87. Cook, Plan, supra note 85, at 374. 
88. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER c. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PruvATE PROPERTY 277-87 (1932). 
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You might as well ask the clouds in the air to propel the railroad 
locomotives. The stockholders are multitudinous, widely scattered, 
many of them women and estates. They give their proxies to whom-
. soever is in control - blindly and automatically .... They are der-
elicts adrift on an unknown sea, without chart, compass, landmark or 
pilot.89 · 
Under· Cook's plan, the federal government would own a corpo-
ration that held controlling shares in the operating compames. The 
public would continue to ·hold other shares. Cook embodied his 
plan in a bill that was introduced in Congress but not enacted.9° 
In 1919, Cook published a further elaboration of his plan and 
compared its merits with those of his competitors. The first ele-
ment of his revised plan was to consolidate the hundreds of railroad 
companies into a few trunk lines arranged so that they would com-
pete with each other but would use common terminals.91 His sec-
ond postulate was that government should either guarantee the 
railroads a reasonable return by payments from the public treasury 
or should set their rates at levels that would let them earn a fair 
retum.92 Third, the government should regulate the railroads but 
should not own them.93 Fourth, the major trunk lines should be 
federally incorporated - an idea as to which Cook declared "there 
is practically no dissent. "94 
Although Cook's plan would have given a government agency 
voting control over railroad compapies, he insisted that this was not 
government ownership,95 the avoidance of which was his central 
purpose: 
The danger is that the 'public, out bf sheer disgust with present rail-
road rates and service, may abandon all real public control of the rail-
roads, and allow the reactionaries to have their way. That way leads 
to still higher rates and ultimate Government ownership.96 
SUMMATION 
Cook was a leader in redirecting corporation theory from a sys-
tem of state-given powers and disabilities to a structure of investors' 
rights and liabilities. He was among the first to recognize and to 
denounce the exploitation of investors by promoters and managers, 
and to proclaim the impotence of individual shareholders in rela-
89. Cook, Plan, supra note 85, at 374. 
90. CooK, SOLUTION, supra note 17, at 9. 
91. Id. at 1-6. 
92. Id. at 6. 
93. Id. at 6-7. 
94. Id. at 8. 
95. Id. at 7. 
96. Id. at 30. 
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tion to the powers of management. He recognized the need for 
government participation in the administration of railroads many 
decades before Conrail and Amtrak met that need. The vision of 
legal education that he endowed in the Law Quadrangle was a fit-
ting capstone for the vision of better business corporations that he 
promoted in his professional publications. 
